The Opportunity in Commercial Approaches for Future NASA Deep Space Exploration Elements by Zapata, Edgar
The Opportunity in Commercial Approaches for 
Future NASA Deep Space Exploration Elements
Edgar Zapata NASA Kennedy Space Center
Presented at
The American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics Space 2017 Forum
Session: Reinventing Space II
Orlando FL, September 12-14, 2017
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170008820 2019-08-29T23:09:49+00:00Z
1. Commercial & Cost Data
Tomorrow – Sept. 13, Space Cost and Economics, 10am-12:30pm
“An Assessment of Cost Improvements in the NASA COTS/CRS Program and 
Implications for Future NASA Missions”
2. Estimating Costs for New Elements from Data
Here – Sept. 12, Reinventing Space II, 3:30-6:30pm
“The Opportunity in Commercial Approaches for Future NASA Deep Space 
Exploration Elements”
3. Exploration Scenarios
Later – Sept. 12, Space Exploration, 7:30-9pm
“NASA Human Spaceflight Scenarios Do All Our Models Still Say ‘No’?”
Context
2
Data
Estimates
Architectures
• Explore the potential for commercial partnerships, modeled on recent 
programs, to reduce the cost to NASA for “…other required deep 
space exploration capabilities…”
Purpose
3
• Increased affordability and other improvements in partnerships for 
cargo and crew to ISS
• Tomorrow – Sept. 13, Space Cost and Economics, 10am-12:30pm
• Location: Celebration 2
“An Assessment of Cost Improvements in the NASA COTS/CRS Program and 
Implications for Future NASA Missions”
• 2016 NASA request for information stated it must “maximize the 
efficiency and sustainability of the Exploration Systems development 
programs”, as “critical to free resources for re-investment…such as 
other required deep space exploration capabilities.”
Background
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• Cancellation of Constellation program can be seen simply, as not adding a 
lunar lander to NASA’s budget, potentially another billion+ dollars a year
• Multiple deep space exploration elements are like multiple’s of the kind of 
programs NASA has usually been approved for – one or two at a time
…when exploration approaches depend on adding ever more layers of cost to NASA’s 
budget, even adding money just delays re-entering the same trap…
…then “you are right back where you started, the budget crashes, you can’t afford to 
build the new thing without cancelling the old thing.”
Jeff Greason, “A Settlement Strategy for NASA, NSS Keynote Address,” 2011
Background
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• There are a dozen+ items like landers in deep space exploration
• Probes
• Communications
• Stages
• Landers
• Habitation in-space
• Habitation at the surface destination
• And much more…spacesuits, rovers, other unique spacecraft, ISRU, surface 
power, depots, refillable stages, tankers, etc.
Background
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We know we must reduce the costs of deep space systems significantly 
or no NASA space exploration plans ever add up (budget / costs, time, 
and other “-ilities”)
• Tonight – Sept. 12, Space Exploration, 7:30-9pm
• Location: Exposition Hall
“NASA Human Spaceflight Scenarios, Do All Our Models Still Say ‘No’?”
Background
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• Beyond LEO
• Schier, J., “Concept for a Lunar Power and Communications Utility,” 2015
• Zuniga, A., Turner, M., Rasky, D., Pittmann, R., Zapata, E., “Kickstarting a New 
Era of Lunar Industrialization via Campaigns of Lunar COTS Missions,” , 2016
• Beyond NASA
• Non-NASA customers preferable, but not a litmus test
• Many aspects to what’s “commercial” to NASA – NASA “investor” mindset, 
“cost risk” posture, risk buy-down process, # of partners, “services”, more…
• Beyond Biases
• Quantify before making decisions
• Can’t afford not to consider all options!
Commercial – Beyond…
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$ per kg of System to Develop or to Make & Operate• ? Umm…say a deep space spacecraft 
could be about 10,000 kg dry mass
~$5B to develop
~$700M per unit, to make/op
• ?Umm…say a small Apollo scale lunar 
lander is just over 4,000 kg dry mass
~$2B to develop
~$300M per unit, to make/op…
(Here’s where Spock says “Fascinating”)
What’s Our Back of our Napkin Look Like?
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Of course, we know this 
is all wrong! But it hints 
at something that might 
be on target.
• Deep space spacecraft are much more complex right?
• Landers are much more complex right?
…maybe not.
What’s Our Back of our Napkin Look Like?
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• Assumption: If complexity tells us 
about costs, then costs tells us 
about complexity
Apollo cost data indirectly tells us the 
Apollo lander was LESS complex or
ABOUT AS as complex as it’s sister 
spacecraft
Method – Forget Commercial Data a Moment – Look to Apollo
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• Scale relationships bounded by dry mass
• Complexity relationships bounded by actual Apollo experience
+ many dusty and dry equations
Method
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Gather 
Historical Data
Review, Parse, 
Organize
• item type, scale, 
type of cost, 
acquisition 
approach, 
acquisition 
process costs, 
etc.
• multiple sources
• consistency?
• credibility?
• completeness?
• inflation 
adjustment
Historical Item $
Up-front vs. 
Operational $
Procurement vs. 
Government $
Extrapolate
New Item $
“Cost Baseball 
Cards”
• sanity check
• estimate a known 
quantity, compare
• sanity check
• stepping back
• strengths and 
weaknesses
• rack and stack
Development (Non-recurring $) NASA or Gov't 
Costs $M nom. 
(see below)
Company 
Investment $M 
nom. (see 
below)
NASA or Gov't Costs 
$M 2017$ (see below)
Company Investment 
$M 2017$
Development 
Sum $M 2017$
SpaceX (Falcon 9 & Dragon 1.0) 
2006 - 2011 396$                  454$                  475$                                  545$                                  1,020$                    
OSC (Antares and Cygnus) 2008 - 
2011 288$                  590$                  337$                                  691$                                  1,192$                    
Non-COTS Budget, ISS 
Program $ -> OSC 62$                     74$                                    
Non-COTS Budget, State of 
Virginia $ -> OSC 75$                     90$                                    
Kistler 2006-2007 32$                     39$                                    39$                         
Totals Procurement $ 853$                  1,044$               1,015$                               1,235$                               2,251$                    
NASA Prog/proj Management (civil 
servants et al) 23$                     28$                                    
Totals (Procurement $ + NASA P/p 
Mang'mt) 876$                  1,043$                               54%
Development (Non-recurring $) NASA or Gov't 
Costs $M nom. 
(see below)
Company 
Investment $M 
nom. (see 
below)
NASA or Gov't Costs 
$M 2017$ (see below)
Company Investment 
$M 2017$
Development 
Sum $M 2017$
SpaceX (Falcon 9 & Dragon 1.0) 
2006 - 2011 396$                  454$                  475$                                  545$                                  1,020$                    
OSC (Antares and Cygnus) 2008 - 
2011 288$                  590$                  337$                                  691$                                  1,192$                    
Non-COTS Budget, ISS 
Program $ -> OSC 62$                     74$                                    
Non-COTS Budget, State of 
Virginia $ -> OSC 75$                     90$                                    
Kistler 2006-2007 32$                     39$                                    39$                         
Totals Procurement $ 853$                  1,044$               1,015$                               1,235$                               2,251$                    
NASA Prog/proj anagement (civil 
servants et al) 23$                     28$                                    
Totals (Procurement $ + NASA P/p 
Mang'mt) 876$                  1,043$                               54%
Development (Non-recurring $) NASA or Gov't 
Costs $M nom. 
(see below)
Company 
Investment $M 
nom. (see 
below)
NASA or Gov't Costs 
$M 2017$ (see below)
Company Investment 
$M 2017$
Development 
Sum $M 2017$
SpaceX (Falcon 9 & Dragon 1.0) 
2006 - 2011 396$                  454$                  475$                                  545$                                  1,020$                    
OSC (Antares and Cygnus) 2008 - 
2011 288$                  590$                  337$                                  691$                                  1,192$                    
Non-COTS Budget, ISS 
Program $ -> OSC 62$                     74$                                    
Non-COTS Budget, State of 
Virginia $ -> OSC 75$                     90$                                    
Kistler 2006-2007 32$                     39$                                    39$                         
Totals Procurement $ 853$                  1,044$               1,015$                               1,235$                               2,251$                    
NASA Prog/proj anagement (civil 
servants et al) 23$                     28$                                    
Totals (Procurement $ + NASA P/p 
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Cost Estimating 
Relationships
Analogs
Ratios
Scaling
Uncertainties & 
Bounds
(CER 1 vs. CER 2)
• landers
• in-space stages
• more…
• data sheets
• sources
• traceable
• transparent
Introduction to a “Costed” Baseball Card – Landers Example
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Lunar & Mars Landers - Development
Description of Basis of Estimate:
Cost estimating relationships combine older (Apollo) and recent 
(Commercial Crew, Orion) historical data according to the acquisition 
approach indicated (cost-plus or commercial, public private 
partnership / PPP).
If the acquisition approach is a commercial, public private partnership, 
the lander cost estimate departs from the experience with either the 
CST-100 or the Dragon crew spacecraft. 
If the acquisition approach is cost-plus, sole-source, the lander cost 
estimate departs from the experience with the Orion crew spacecraft.
Notes:
1. These are procurement dollars ONLY, in 2017 $. Estimates do NOT include 
government program & project management.
2. All estimates are for 1 provider. Generally, for partnerships with multiple partners use 
2X the average of lo/hi plus process costs (other early partner investments).
3. Development includes flight test.
4. Ground Ops & Launch, Flight Ops: IF a commercial / PPP basis, ground ops & launch 
and flight ops development are within the development estimate, and ground ops & 
launch are within the per unit estimate. IF cost-plus / sole-source, ground ops & 
launch and flight ops are NOT included in any estimates.
5. Mission Ops: For all estimates, additional costs must be estimated for especially 
unique in-space operations (rendezvous, mate, transfer of propellant, etc. as apply.)
Lunar Apollo LM Lunar Constellation Altair
Mars  Lander Concept
Lander Scale 
&
Acquisition 
Approach
Apollo Scale Lunar 
Lander 
$B Development
Altair Lunar Lander 
(does not do LOI) 
$B Development
Altair Lunar Lander 
(does LOI) 
$B Development
Mars Lander
(ver. 40t Payload, 
incl. MAV) 
$B Development
No Prop. Mass 
(kg)
4,214 8,392 12,829 19,881
Mass at Liftoff 
(kg)
15,065 30,000 45,864
71,076
Commercial / 
PPP - Low $2.4 $3.4 $4.3 $6
Commercial / 
PPP - High $4.3 $6.0 $7.7 $10
Cost-Plus, Sole 
Source $15.1 $20.8 $26.9 $36
W. MAV LOX
LO
HI
NASA LCC Model 5/8/2017
Introduction to a “Costed” Baseball Card – Landers Example
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Lunar & Mars Landers - Manufacture
Lunar Apollo LM Lunar Constellation Altair
Lander Scale 
&
Acquisition 
Approach
Apollo Scale Lunar 
Lander
$B per Unit
Altair Lunar Lander 
(does not do LOI) 
$B Per Unit
Altair Lunar Lander 
(does LOI) 
$B Per Unit
Mars Lander (ver. 
40t Payload, incl. 
MAV) 
$ B per Unit
No Prop. Mass 
(kg)
4,214 8,392 12,829 19,881
Mass at Liftoff 
(kg)
15,065 30,000 45,864
71,076
Commercial / 
PPP - Low $0.6 $0.8 $1.0 $1.4
Commercial / 
PPP - High $0.9 $1.3 $1.7 $2.3
Cost-Plus, Sole 
Source $1.3 $1.8 $2.3 $3.1
Mars  Lander Concept
LO
HI
Description of Basis of Estimate:
Cost estimating relationships combine older (Apollo) and recent 
(Commercial Crew, Orion) historical data according to the acquisition 
approach indicated (cost-plus or commercial, public private 
partnership / PPP).
If the acquisition approach is a commercial, public private partnership, 
the lander cost estimate departs from the experience with either the 
CST-100 or the Dragon crew spacecraft. 
If the acquisition approach is cost-plus, sole-source, the lander cost 
estimate departs from the experience with the Orion crew spacecraft.
W. MAV LOX
NASA LCC Model 5/8/2017
Notes:
1. These are procurement dollars ONLY, in 2017 $. Estimates do NOT include 
government program & project management.
2. All estimates are for 1 provider. Generally, for partnerships with multiple partners use 
2X the average of lo/hi plus process costs (other early partner investments).
3. Development includes flight test.
4. Ground Ops & Launch, Flight Ops: IF a commercial / PPP basis, ground ops & launch 
and flight ops development are within the development estimate, and ground ops & 
launch are within the per unit estimate. IF cost-plus / sole-source, ground ops & 
launch and flight ops are NOT included in any estimates.
5. Mission Ops: For all estimates, additional costs must be estimated for especially 
unique in-space operations (rendezvous, mate, transfer of propellant, etc. as apply.)
• Reference checks of cost-plus Altair scale lunar lander development $8-12B vs. 
$21-27B
• LOW – but we know these references severely underestimated other related elements
• Accounting issues (NAFCOM-ish estimates often place significant element life cycle costs in 
other budget lines like program integration, etc.)
• JPL Mars lander estimate in the $44B range (cost-plus? lander $ thru 1st long stay)
• Roughly consistent with the $36B (cost-plus) here
• What’s-in / what’s out issues, etc.
• Commercial / Cost-plus relationships the same; what varies are the points of 
departure
• Lander Costed Baseball Cards
Sane (so far)        Insane
Sanity Checking
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• Pros
• “Quantifying” and “justifying” factors applied to historical costs
• Extensive notes / justifications with all adjustments, calculations, deviations from 
historical data
• “Justifying” factors – see “Independent Cost Assessment of the Commercial Crew 
Program”, Booz-Allen Hamilton
• Cons
• Identified where estimates likely low/high and why
• Uncertainty
• Esp. complexity – the leap from what we know to what we want
Data sheets available for collaboration upon request
Pros, Cons, Uncertainty
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Relationships
Scaling
Complexity
Commercial, cost-plus
Landers
Lunar
Mars
Propulsive & Propellant Elements
Stages
Tankers
Depots
Habitation - next
More?
Summary & Forward Work
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• Significant cost reductions from the norm of cost-plus contracting are possible for new space system 
elements in NASA’s exploration scenarios. We analyzed landers and stages across scales and types for life 
cycle costs, development, and manufacturing (some with operations), if these were acquired using 
commercial / public private partnerships. There is no basis to conclude that public private partnerships end 
at low Earth orbit, prohibited or incapable of going beyond that point to deep space, the moon or Mars.
• Data sheets and cost estimation sheets are available upon request to assure the broadest dissemination of 
knowledge, further peer review, and continuous improvement of these life cycle cost estimates to date.
• Including these commercial options in NASA space exploration architectures, that assembly of many space 
systems for specific missions, could significantly improve two factors where NASA exploration programs face 
difficulties. Deep space systems as public private partnerships could significantly reduce the cumulative cost 
of deep space exploration elements while addressing the risk of irrelevance, as reduced costs equal 
outcomes that are sooner rather than forever a matter for another generation.
• Lastly, it’s recommended that NASA acquisition processes avoid prematurely favoring one contracting 
approach over another, avoiding the preconception very advanced systems must fall under traditional cost-
plus like contracting. Partnerships are investments before they might ever be acquisitions. Investment & 
Acquisition processes should formally place all options on the table and assess NASA needs vs. industry 
capabilities in a traceable process that creates successful outcomes for NASA while growing the space sector.
Conclusions & Recommendations
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